Now Playing: COUNTERFACTUALS WEEK (REPOSTED FOR THE 2ND TIME)
Chances, Counterfactuals and Similarity
By Robert Williams
John Hawthorne in a recent paper takes issue with Lewisian accounts of counterfactuals, when relevant laws of nature are chancy. I respond to his arguments on behalf of the Lewisian, and conclude that while some can be rebutted, the case against the original Lewisian account is strong. I develop a revised neo-Lewisian account of what makes for closeness of worlds in the context of chancy laws of nature. I argue that my revised version avoids Hawthorne's challenges. I argue that this is closer to the spirit of Lewis' first (non-chancy) proposal than is Lewis' own suggested modification.
Source: Online Papers in Philosophy
Firstly reposted on March the 11th, 2005