Topic: Cognition & Epistemology
Probability, Modality and Triviality
By Antony Eagle
Many philosophers accept the following three theses:(1) that probability is a modal concept;
(2) that, if determinism is true, therewould still be objective modal facts; and
(3) that if determinism is true, there are no genuine objective probabilities (chances).
I argue that these 3 claims are inconsistent, and that their widespread acceptance is thus quite troubling. I suggest, as others have, that we should reject the last thesis: objective probability is perfectly compatible with determinism. Nevertheless we must still explain why this thesis seems attractive; I suggest that a subtle equivocation is to blame.
Source: Online Papers in Philosophy
Posted by Tony Marmo
at 14:01 BST
Updated: Monday, 18 April 2005 14:03 BST
