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LINGUISTIX&LOGIK, Tony Marmo's blog
Wednesday, 26 July 2006

Topic: Cognition & Epistemology


By Peter Murphy

This paper looks at an argument strategy for assessing the epistemic closure principle. This is the principle that says knowledge is closed under known entailment; or (roughly) if S knows p and S knows that p entails q, then S knows that q. The strategy in question looks to the individual conditions on knowledge to see if they are closed. According to one conjecture, if all the individual conditions are closed, then so too is knowledge. I give a deductive argument for this conjecture. According to a second conjecture, if one (or more) condition is not closed, then neither is knowledge. I give an inductive argument for this conjecture. In sum, I defend the strategy by defending the claim that knowledge is closed if, and only if, all the conditions on knowledge are closed. After making my case, I look at what this means for the debate over whether knowledge is closed.

Forthcoming in Erkenntnis

Posted by Tony Marmo at 17:41 BST
Saturday, 8 July 2006


Scopal Independence:

A Note on Branching and Wide Scope Readings of Indefinites and Disjunctions

By Philippe Schlenker

Hintikka claimed in the 1970s that indefinites and disjunctions give rise to 'branching readings' that can only be handled by a 'game-theoretic' semantics as expressive as a logic with (a limited form of) quantification over Skolem functions. Due to empirical and methodological difficulties, the issue was left unresolved in the linguistic literature. Independently, however, it was discovered in the 1980s that, contrary to other quantifiers, indefinites may scope out of syntactic islands. We claim [here] that branching readings and the island-escaping behavior of indefinites are two sides of the same coin: when the latter problem is considered in full generality, a mechanism of 'functional quantification' (Winter 2004) must be postulated which is strictly more expressive than Hintikka's, and which predicts that his branching readings are indeed real, although his own solution was insufficiently general. Furthermore, we suggest that, as Hintikka had seen, disjunctions share the behavior of indefinites, both with respect to island-escaping behavior and (probably) branching readings. The functional analysis can thus naturally be extended to them.

Source: Institut Jean-Nicod.
To appear in Journal of Semantics.

Posted by Tony Marmo at 03:43 BST
Updated: Saturday, 8 July 2006 03:56 BST
Friday, 30 June 2006


Logic Inference in Polynomial Format

By Walter Carnielli

The methods described in this paper have a promising potential to any truth-functional multi-valued logic: there is an exciting area of research in designing new proof theory techniques for such logics, and simplifying applications to multi-valued logics in decision tables and discovering patterns, as in several other fields (it is well-known that multi-valued logics find applications in artificial intelligence, database theory and data mining, modeling reasoning and model checking, for instance). It is important to emphasize that the method is also plainly applicable to non-finite valued logics, and also to represent binary semantics for many-valued logics5 (cf. [13]) and even to quantum circuits and quantum gates (cf. [1]). The arguments advanced here try to conceptualize this approach, in particular when extended to quantification and non-finite valued logics, as inheritance of an admirable legacy in the mathematical thinking, which may have been disregarded by logicians.

Source: CLE e-prints

Posted by Tony Marmo at 02:41 BST
Updated: Friday, 30 June 2006 02:42 BST
Thursday, 15 June 2006


Meaning and Dialogue Coherence: A Proof-theoretic Investigation

By Paul Piwek

This paper presents a novel proof-theoretic account of dialogue coherence. It focuses on cooperative information-oriented dialogues and describes how the structure of such dialogues can be accounted for in terms of a multi-agent hybrid inference system that mixes natural deduction with information transfer and observation. We show how the structure of dialogue arises out of the interplay between the inferential roles of logical connectives (i.e., sentence semantics), a rule for transferring information between agents, and rules for information flow between agents and their environment. Our order of explanation is opposite in direction to that adopted in the game-theoretic semantics tradition, where sentence semantics (or a notion of valid inferences) is derived from (winning) dialogue strategies. The approaches may, however, be reconcilable, since we focus on cooperative dialogues, whereas the latter concentrates on adversarial dialogue.

Keywords: natural deduction, dialogue, coherence, hybrid inference

In: Proceedings of ESSLLI Workshop on Coherence in Generation and Dialogue, M'alaga, Spain, 2006, pp. 57-64.
Source: Semantics Archive

Posted by Tony Marmo at 16:31 BST
Saturday, 10 June 2006


Modal Deduction in Second-Order Logic and Set Theory-I

By Johan van Benthem, Giovanna D'Agostino, Angelo Montanari, Alberto Policriti

We investigate modal deduction through translation into standard logic and set theory. Derivability in the minimal modal logic is captured precisely by translation into a weak, computationally attractive set theory \Omega. This approach is shown equivalent to working with standard first-order translations of modal formulas in a theory of general frames. Next, deduction in a more powerful second?order logic of general frames is shown equivalent with set?theoretic derivability in an `admissible variant' of \Omega. Our methods are mainly model?theoretic and set?theoretic, and they admit extension to richer languages than that of basic modal logic. Read more [1] [2]; [3]

Appeared in Journal of Logic and Computation 1997 7(2):251-265

Modal Deduction in Second-Order Logic and Set Theory - II

By Johan van Benthem, Giovanna D'Agostino, Angelo Montanari, Alberto Policriti

In this paper, we generalize the set-theoretic translation method for poly-modal logic introduced in [11] to extended modal logics. Instead of devising an ad-hoc translation for each logic, we develop a general framework within which a number of extended modal logics can be dealt with. We first extend the basic set-theoretic translation method to weak monadic second-order logic through a suitable change in the underlying set theory that connects up in interesting ways with constructibility; then, we show how to tailor such a translation to work with specific cases of extended modal logics.

Keywords: Modal Logic; Modal Deduction; Translation Methods; Second-Order Logic; Set Theory

Appeared in Studia Logica, Volume 60, Number 3, May 1998, pp. 387-420(34)

Modal Logic and Set Theory: a Set-Theoretic Interpretation of Modal Logic

Giovanna D’Agostino, Angelo Montanari, and Alberto Policriti

In this paper, we describe a novel set-theoretic interpretation of modal logic and show how it allows us to build promising bridges between modal deduction and set -theoretic reasoning. More specifically, we describe a translation technique that maps modal formulae into set-theoretic terms, thus making it possible to successfully exploit derivability in first-order set theories to implement derivability in modal logic.

Appeared in JFAK, a collection of essays dedicated to Johan van Benthem on the occasion of his 50th birthday, on June 12, 1999 (Edited by Jelle Gerbrandy et al.)

Posted by Tony Marmo at 00:01 BST
Updated: Saturday, 10 June 2006 03:38 BST
Monday, 5 June 2006


On Aristotle and Baldness- Topic, Reference, Presupposition, and Negation

By Johan Brandtler

This paper is a contribution to the never settled debate on reference, negation and presupposition of existence in the linguistic/philosophical literature. Based on Swedish and English data, the discussion is an attempt to present a unified account of the opposing views put forward in the works of Aristotle, Frege (1892), Russell (1905) and Strawson (1950). The starting point is the observed asymmetry in Swedish (and English) that negation may precede a quantified subject NP in the first position, but not a definite subject NP or a proper name. This asymmetry is argued to be due to semantic, rather than syntactic, restrictions. In the model proposed here, negating a topic NP affects the “topic selection”. This is allowed with quantified NPs, since negating a quantifier leads only to a modification of the topic selection. For definite/generic subject NPs this cannot be allowed, since negating a definite NP equals cancelling the topic selection. This leads to a ‘crash’ at the semantic level.

keywords: negation, presupposition, reference, topic, aristotle, frege, russell, strawson, quantifiers, semantics

Published in: Working Papers in Scandinavian Syntax, volume 77 (2006), 177-204. Lund University, Sweden.

Source: LingBuzz/000281

Posted by Tony Marmo at 18:32 BST
Thursday, 25 May 2006

Topic: Ontology&possible worlds

Eventism and Pointism

By Zdzislaw Augustynek

The domain of contemporary physics consists of two different classes of objects:
a) physical objects ? point events (shortly ? events), elementary particles (and their aggregates), and fields;
b) spatio-temporal objects ? space-time points (shortly ? points), moments, space points, and their corresponding sets: space-time, time and physical space.

If objects of some kind (physical or spatio-temporal) are treated as individuals, i.e. nonsets, then it is possible to define the remaining kinds of objects from both above-mentioned classes. In this way one can construct two alternative monistic ontologies of physics: eventism founded on events, and pointism founded on points. It is also possible to establish a dualistic ontology of physics, based both on events and points treated as individuals.
In this paper these three ontologies are presented with particular emphasis on some extreme versions of monistic ontologies. I shall compare them considering both their respective advantages and difficulties and trying to justify my own choice of eventistic ontology.

Source: Logic and Logical Philosophy, No. 1, 1993, pp. 169

Posted by Tony Marmo at 17:19 BST
Updated: Thursday, 25 May 2006 17:22 BST
Tuesday, 16 May 2006


A Short Note on Gentzen's LJ and NJ Systems Isomorphism

By Wagner Sanz

We state a new intuitionistic sequent calculus and use it to clarify Gentzen's NJ and LJ isomorphism, it contains new negation rules which are immediate readings of what seems to be good and sound natural deduction rules.
Sequent Calculus, Natural Deduction, Intuitionism, Negation.

CLE e-prints

Posted by Tony Marmo at 16:58 BST
Updated: Tuesday, 16 May 2006 17:02 BST
Friday, 5 May 2006


A game-theoretic account of implicature

By Prashant Parikh

I use game theory, decision theory, and situation theory to model a class of implicatures. Two types of relevance are distinguished and used to construct a model of Gricean communication between speaker and addressee.

Source: Proceedings of the 4th conference on Theoretical aspects of reasoning about knowledge, Monterey, California, Pages: 85 - 94 Year of Publication: 1992

Posted by Tony Marmo at 16:46 BST
Updated: Friday, 5 May 2006 16:50 BST
Wednesday, 26 April 2006


A Logic for Ambiguous Description

By Arthur Buchsbaum

A logic formalizing ambiguity, which appears both in natural language and in mathematical discourse, is presented, through a sequent calculus and a semantics, together with some elementary results.

Author Keywords: ambiguous description; designators; rigidity
Appeared in 'Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science' Volume 67, October 2002, Pages 1-18 WoLLIC'2002, 9th Workhop on Logic, Language, Information and Computation

Posted by Tony Marmo at 14:44 BST
Wednesday, 12 April 2006

Topic: Counterfactuals

Conditional Excluded Middle in Systems of Consequential Implication

By Claudio Pizzi & Timothy Williamson

It is natural to ask under what conditions negating a conditional is equivalent to negating its consequent. Given a bivalent background logic, this is equivalent to asking about the conjunction of Conditional Excluded Middle (CEM, opposite conditionals are not both false) and Weak Boethius’ Thesis (WBT, opposite conditionals are not both true). In the system CI.0 of consequential implication, which is intertranslatable with the modal logic KT, WBT is a theorem, so it is natural to ask which instances of CEM are derivable. We also investigate the systems CIw and CI of consequential implication, corresponding to the modal logics K and KD respectively, with occasional remarks about stronger systems. While unrestricted CEM produces modal collapse in all these systems, CEM restricted to contingent formulas yields the Alt2 axiom (semantically, each world can see at most two worlds), which corresponds to the symmetry of consequential implication. It is proved that in all the main systems considered, a given instance of CEM is derivable if and only if the result of replacing consequential implication by the material biconditional in one or other of its disjuncts is provable. Several related results are also proved. The methods of the paper are those of propositional modal logic as applied to a special sort of conditional.

Appeared at the Journal of Philosophical Logic 34, 4 (2005): 333-362

Posted by Tony Marmo at 05:58 BST

Topic: Counterfactuals

Gestalt Effects in Counterfactual and Abductive Inference

By Claudio Pizzi

This paper begins by focusing the basic idea that Gestalt phenomena belong not only to the realm of perception but to the realm of inference. It is shown that Gestalt effects (i.e. the derivability of incompatible indifferent conclusions on the basis of the same background information) often occur both in counterfactual and in ampliative – i.e. inductive and abductive – reasoning. The main thesis of the paper is that the common feature of such forms of non-deductive reasoning is provided by a rational selection between incompatible conclusions, where rationality lies in the choice of the alternative which preserves the maximum of background information. It is also stressed a distinction between a weak and a strong notion of incompatibility. Such distinction may help in giving account of some alleged Gestalt phenomena which have been recognized in theory construction and theory change.

Keywords: Abduction, Counterfactuals, Induction, Gestalt, Rationality

To appear in the L. J. of the IGPL

Posted by Tony Marmo at 00:01 BST
Updated: Wednesday, 12 April 2006 05:49 BST
Saturday, 8 April 2006


Flexible Temporal Consistency for Fixed-Time Constraint Verification in Grid Workflow Systems

By Jinjun Chen & Yun Yang

To verify fixed-time constraints in grid workflow systems, the consistency and inconsistency conditions have been defined in the conventional work. However, in this paper, we argue that although the conventional consistency condition is reasonable, the conventional inconsistency condition is too rigorous and covers several different situations. These situations which are handled conventionally by the same exception handling should be handled differently for cost saving. Therefore, we divide the conventional inconsistency into weak consistency,weak inconsistency and strong inconsistency and treat the conventional consistency as strong consistency. Correspondingly, we discuss how to verify them. Especially, for the weak consistency, we present a method on how to adjust it to the strong consistency. For the weak inconsistency, we analyse why it can be handled by simpler and more economical exception handling. The final comparison and discussion further demonstrate that our research can achieve better cost effectiveness than the conventional work.

Appeared in Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Volume 3795 / 2005

Posted by Tony Marmo at 01:16 BST
Updated: Saturday, 8 April 2006 01:18 BST
Thursday, 6 April 2006

Topic: Counterfactuals

Counterfactuals in a Dynamic Context

By Kai von Fintel

This paper has presented a sketch of an alternative implementation of the standard possible worlds semantics of counterfactuals.

The Presupposition of Subjunctive Conditionals

By Kai von Fintel

Why are some conditionals subjunctive? It is often assumed that at least one crucial difference is that subjunctive conditionals presuppose that their antecedent is false, that they are counterfactual (Lakoff 1970). The traditional theory has apparently been refuted. Perhaps the clearest counter-example is one given by Alan Anderson (1951: 37): If Jones had taken arsenic, he would have shown just exactly those symptoms which he does in fact show. A typical place to use such a subjunctive conditional would be in the course of an argument that tries to bolster the hypothesis that Jones did in fact take arsenic. But then it would of course be self-defeating to presuppose that the hypothesis is false. Thus, something else must be going on.

Posted by Tony Marmo at 00:01 BST
Updated: Friday, 7 April 2006 01:45 BST
Friday, 31 March 2006

Topic: Interconnections

Information and knowledge: an evolutionary framework for information Science

By Marcia J Bates

Background. Many definitions of information, knowledge, and data have been suggested throughout the history of information science. In this article, the objective is to provide definitions that are usable for the physical, biological, and social meanings of the terms, covering the various senses important to our field.

Argument. Information 1 is defined as the pattern of organization of matter and energy. Information 2 is defined as some pattern of organization of matter and energy that has been given meaning by a living being. Knowledge is defined as information given meaning and integrated with other contents of understanding.

Elaboration. The approach is rooted in an evolutionary framework; that is, modes of information perception, processing, transmission, and storage are seen to have developed as a part of the general evolution of members of the animal kingdom. Brains are expensive for animals to support; consequently, efficient storage, including, particularly, storage at emergent levels-for example, storing the concept of chair, rather than specific memories of all chairs ever seen, is powerful and effective for animals. Conclusion. Thus, rather than being reductionist, the approach taken demonstrates the fundamentally emergent nature of most of what higher animals and human beings, in particular, experience as information.


Source: Philoinfo group

Posted by Tony Marmo at 17:53 GMT
Updated: Friday, 31 March 2006 17:59 GMT

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