Properties and Paradox in Graham Priest's
By Daniel Nolan
Graham Priest's book is a treasure-trove, with many interesting things to discuss, but in these remarks, I want to address two main questions. The first concerns what properties and relations Priest's non-existent objects should have simpliciter. The second is the question of whether Priest's framework needs dialetheism - should the framework only be attractive to those who accept true contradictions? In these remarks I plan to grant, for the sake of discussion at least, that there are non-existent objects. I take it that the question of whether there really are things that don't exist is one that is to be settled once we see how well the rival theories do - and so developing a theory of non-existent objects seems to me an important preliminary to the judgement of whether there are, after all, such things.
To appear in a book symposium in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Source: Online Papers in Philosophy