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LINGUISTIX&LOGIK, Tony Marmo's blog
Wednesday, 13 April 2005

Topic: GENERAL LOGIC

Minimalists about Truth can (and should) be Epistemicists, and it helps if they are revision theorists too


By Greg Restall


Minimalists about truth say that the important properties of the truth predicate are revealed in the class of T-biconditionals. Most minimalists demur from taking all of the T-biconditionals of the form 'p' is true if and only if p, to be true, because to do so leads to paradox. But exactly which biconditionals turn out to be true? I take a leaf out of the epistemic account of vagueness to show how the minimalist can avoid giving a comprehensive answer to that question. I also show that this response is entailed by taking minimalism seriously, and that objections to this position may be usefully aided and abetted by Gupta and Belnap’s revision theory of truth.

Posted by Tony Marmo at 15:45 BST

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