**Topic:**

**GENERAL LOGIC**

## Minimalists about Truth can (and should) be Epistemicists, and it helps if they are revision theorists too

By Greg Restall

Minimalists about truth say that the important properties of the truth predicate are revealed in the class of T-biconditionals. Most minimalists demur from takingallof the T-biconditionals of the form, to be true, because to do so leads to paradox. But exactly'p'is true if and only if pwhichbiconditionals turn out to be true? I take a leaf out of the epistemic account of vagueness to show how the minimalist can avoid giving a comprehensive answer to that question. I also show that this response isentailedby taking minimalism seriously, and that objections to this position may be usefully aided and abetted by Gupta and Belnap’srevisiontheory of truth.

Posted by Tony Marmo
at 15:45 BST